Korea Opportunities, Again

On November 10 the Obama Administration announced that it would dispatch its special representative Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang before the year end for bilateral talks with North Korea to try to facilitate the resumption of the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program. The Obama Administration stressed that it is "not going to reward North Korea simply for returning to the six-party talks," but that it will be looking to see whether North Korea intends to discharge its international obligations by implementing previous international agreements.

In his speech delivered in Tokyo on November 14, President Obama indicated in clear terms the steps that North Korea must take to improve relations between the United States and its neighboring countries, including "a return to the Six-Party Talks; upholding previous commitments, including a return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and the full and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula," as well as insisting that "Japanese families receive a full accounting of those who have been abducted."

For the time being, the Japanese have been reassured by this position of the Obama Administration. However, the fact that the United States is entering into direct negotiations with North Korea is a highly sensitive issue as far as Japan is concerned, because there is clearly a difference of understanding between Japan and the United States in respect of both the nuclear and abduction issues. For Japan, which is within range of North Korea's Nodong missiles, North Korea's nuclear weapons are a direct threat to security. However, North Korea does not have the capability to attack the United States mainland. Also, for Japan the abduction issue is a rare case of the systematic violation of the lives and safety of their fellow countrymen by an external enemy since the Second World War. In the sixty-four years following the War Japan has never once used armed force. During this period, the only systematic violation of lives and safety by an external enemy that come to mind for the people of Japan who have never gone to war, apart from the abductions by North Korea, are the 9/11 terrorist attacks. So when the abduction issue came to light in the late 1990s the psychological shock experienced by the Japanese far exceeded that imagined by foreign observers.

Disillusionment

In the eyes of the Japanese, compromise on either the nuclear issue or the abduction issue is unacceptable. However, how does the United States view these issues? One of the main reasons why Japan supported the United States in the Iraq War was that it expected in return the cooperation of the United States on both the North Korea nuclear issue and the abduction issue. However, immediately following the first nuclear testing by Pyongyang in October 2006, the Bush Administration suddenly agreed to negotiate directly with North Korea, something it had refused to do until then, creating a sense of disillusionment in the Japanese. As this example shows, the United States may well, if it deems it appropriate for the national interest, make concessions to North Korea on the nuclear issue or abduction issue without considering Japan's position. This is the anxiety that is simmering among the Japanese.

Moreover, Japanese people have a deep-rooted distrust with regard to whether or not diplomatic negotiations with North Korea can produce meaningful results. In order to understand these emotions of the Japanese, we need to take a hard look at what efforts by Japan and the United States to talk and negotiate with North Korea have left us with.

Despite the fact that North Korea showed virtually no cooperative behavior of any substance in response, Tokyo continued to cooperate, for instance with rice aid, almost consistently until around fall 2000. Except in the case of the launch of a Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998, even when North Korea acted uncooperatively or provocatively no sanctions were imposed. Despite the fact that North Korea did not "reciprocate" Japan's cooperative behavior, there was an obvious pattern of reiterated cooperative behavior on the part of Japan. Behind this stance existed the expectation and hope that cooperation would eventually bring North Korea to the discussion table, leading to negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations and the resolution of the abduction, missile, nuclear, and other issues pending between Japan and North Korea. However, in actual fact Japan was unable to accomplish these aims, and the outcome was that North Korea simply took food aid without providing anything in return.

The first visit by then Prime Minister Koizumi in 2002 too was immediately followed by heightened expectations with regard to the resolution of pending issues through talks and negotiations with North Korea. This was because at the first Japan-North Korea summit talks in Pyongyang, Kim Jong Il acknowledged the abductions and "suspicious ships" as the work of North Korean government agencies, and even went as far as to make a verbal apology.

At around the same time, the U.S. Administration too, which had adopted a hard-line stance on North Korea after President George W. Bush assumed office, sent special envoy John Kerry to Pyongyang, believing that the resumption of U.S.-North Korea direct talks requested by North Korea may be possible depending on North Korea's response. However, North Korea acknowledged to Kerry the existence of the uranium enrichment program, communicated false information to Japan in respect of deceased abductees, and even made a one-sided statement at the resumed negotiations for diplomatic normalization that the abduction issue had been resolved, and so forth, itself nipping in the bud any opportunity for talks and negotiations. When North Korea declared its immediate withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003, trilateral talks were held between the United States, China, and North Korea, and from August six-nation talks began with the participation of Japan. However, the "agreements" reached here too have not been adequately implemented owing to North Korea's insincere response.

Following the nuclear experiment in October 2006, the United States suddenly began to take a positive attitude in respect of direct talks with North Korea. The U.S. Administration led by President Obama, inaugurated in January this year, was also actively seeking to engage in dialogue with North Korea. And yet, North Korea went ahead with the test-launch of a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile in April, conducting a second nuclear test in May.

Having seen this kind of behavior displayed by North Korea for so long, many Japanese doubt that negotiation in the usual sense is even possible. What is more, if we continue to seek negotiations that have no prospect of yielding results, regarding the fact of negotiation as an end in itself, it is feared that Japan as well as the United States may be taken advantage of by North Korea.

Japan-U.S. Policy Coordination

Of course, the Japanese do not desire a showdown with North Korea. The Democratic Party of Japan government of Hatayama Yukio that took power in September this year has clearly articulated policies aimed at achieving an East Asian community under the "diplomacy of yuai (fraternity)" banner. And the Japanese government's position is that it wishes to include North Korea in this target if possible. However, the major premise of this is that North Korea initiates specific action to resolve the nuclear issue, the abduction issue, and the issue that President Obama did not mention in Tokyo, the ballistic missile issue. The Japanese feel strongly that mere verbal promises are not enough. The Japanese have had enough of seeing how the numerous promises made by North Korea have turned out to be empty. North Korea needs to demonstrate its goodwill toward Japan and the United States through action.

The new Hatayama Administration arrived on the scene calling for the need to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance, saying it would "build a closer and more equal Japan-U.S. alliance." Though there has been a change of administration, there is no fundamental difference in the stance of both the Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party, both of which see the Japan-U.S. alliance as the centerpiece of Japan's diplomatic and security policies. However, it cannot be denied that the advent of a new administration in Japan after sixteen years is bringing with it friction in various areas of the Japan-U.S. alliance. The United States is no doubt attaching particular importance to problems that could cause fissures in the alliance, such as the delay in the Futenma Air Station relocation, and Japan's assistance to Afghanistan related to the suspension of its refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. However, for Japan, the matter of whether the United States, by negotiating directly with North Korea, will make compromises that are detrimental to Japan is also an extremely important issue.

President Obama stated in Tokyo in respect of North Korea, "We will not be cowed by threats, and we will continue to send a clear message through our actions, and not just our words." What will be required to make these words a reality is tight policy coordination between Tokyo and Washington.